Federalist No. 5 was written by John Jay under the shared pseudonym Publius and published in the Independent Journal on November 10, 1787. It continues Jay’s argument that the United States would be safer under one Union than as several separate confederacies or sovereignties. This essay is the last of Jay’s opening run on the dangers of division and the advantages of national union.
This paper matters because Jay tries a different method here. Instead of arguing mainly from American geography or immediate foreign policy, he uses the historical example of the union between England and Scotland to warn what happens when neighboring governments remain divided. His point is blunt: division breeds rivalry, jealousy, and weakness, while union creates stability and peace.
Full Text of Federalist No. 5
The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
For the Independent Journal.
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN Anne, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the Union then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention.
I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: “An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be enabled to resist all its enemies.” “We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only effectual way to secure our present and future happiness; and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to prevent or delay this union.”
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being “joined in affection and free from all apprehension of different interests,” envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident than the northern hive would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.
Those who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a constant source of discord and dispute. The republic of Venice did not more jealous and suspicious of the small neighboring States than they are apt to be of the larger ones. The States of Holland and of Germany afford examples enough of the truth of this remark.
They who have made accurate observations on the conduct of the different branches of the same government, and who have observed the conduct of neighboring nations, know very well that what has happened in the latter may happen in the former; and that the same passions which divide and agitate men in domestic life may produce the same effects in confederacies and political bodies. The causes are the same and the effects naturally ought to be similar.
With what propriety therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons.
PUBLIUS.
Why Federalist No. 5 Matters
Federalist No. 5 matters because Jay presses the union argument with a historical warning: neighboring governments that ought to cooperate often end up competing, mistrusting, and weakening one another. His use of Britain and Scotland is meant to show that even places that seem naturally connected can become trapped in rivalry if they remain politically divided.
This essay also helps complete Jay’s early sequence. In No. 2, he argues that America is one people. In No. 3 and No. 4, he argues that union reduces foreign danger. In No. 5, he warns that division would create jealousy, fear, and future conflict among the states themselves. It is part of the same larger case: union is not sentimental decoration; it is a practical necessity.
Related Links
- Federalist Papers
- John Jay
- Federalist No. 4
- United States Constitution
- Articles of Confederation
- Anti-Federalists