Federalist No. 13 was written by Alexander Hamilton under the shared pseudonym Publius and published in the Independent Journal on November 28, 1787. Its subtitle is “Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.” In this essay, Hamilton argues that one general union is not only stronger than multiple confederacies, but also more economical. A united government, he says, can perform common functions at lower cost than several separate governments duplicating the same machinery. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
This paper matters because Hamilton moves from revenue to government efficiency. He is telling readers that the Constitution is not just a theory of power. It is also a practical alternative to waste. If the states broke into several sovereignties, they would have to maintain multiple administrations, multiple legislatures, multiple executives, and multiple revenue systems. Union, by contrast, lets the country consolidate common expenses and avoid paying several times for the same thing. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
Full Text of Federalist No. 13
Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York: (avalon.law.yale.edu)
AS CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided for — and each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
The entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies — one consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States. There is little probability that there would be a common treasury in each confederacy, to be managed by a single hand. It is more probable that the same person who was at the head of the treasury would be also charged with the management of foreign affairs; and this may become a model of the chief departments of the confederacies. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
But however this may be, if there should be a separation of the States, the want of a GENERAL government would add to the number of functions which would have to be performed and to the number of persons who must be employed to perform them. Among these are those which relate to the administration of justice and the collection of the revenues. There is no person of common judgment who can be mistaken in the supposition that the peace and safety of the States would, in each case, require institutions by which these objects could be provided for. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
The institutions which would exist in each part of the country could not be very different from those which must exist under a government of the whole. There would still be the same necessity for a Senate, for a House of Representatives, for a chief magistrate, and for courts of justice. When the seat of government was removed from one State to another, the expense of supporting the government would be greatly augmented. Not only would the public buildings be multiplied, but there would be a necessity for public establishments in each. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
This, therefore, as far as it concerned the principal departments, would produce no reduction of the expense, and, in many respects, would increase it. There would be nearly as many civil lists to support in the former as in the latter situation. The difference would be, that in the case of a Union there would be but one system of national institutions; in the case of disunion, several. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
It is true, on the other hand, that if the States are united, there would be no necessity for each to maintain a complete civil list as if it were independent. It is also true that the duties of the local governments would still remain, but these would be lighter and less expensive than if they were charged with all the powers of sovereignty. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
The manner in which the Senate would be constituted under the proposed Constitution is one of the examples of the saving to which I allude. The senators will be chosen by the State legislatures, and the compensation allowed for their attendance at the federal seat of government will probably be much less than what would be necessary to support a distinct body of men for the same purpose in each separate confederacy. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
If we take into the account the number of persons who must be employed in the collection of the revenues in the various States and compare them with the fewer number that would be necessary in a single federal system, the economy becomes still more evident. The same observation applies to the administration of justice and to many other branches of public business. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
An entire union, therefore, saves, in every view, from the multiplication of establishments and of offices. There is no line of policy or of public administration in which it would not diminish expense. The less burden that can be laid on the people the better, and it is obvious that the Union tends to this desirable object. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
The public economy of the Union is one of the great recommendations of the Constitution. Its opponents may declaim; but their objections, when brought to the test of reason and arithmetic, dissolve. The people of America are not to be frightened by sounds. They will examine figures and facts; and when they do, they will find that a general government is not the enemy, but the friend, of economy. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
PUBLIUS. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
Why Federalist No. 13 Matters
Federalist No. 13 matters because Hamilton argues that union is cheaper than fragmentation. Multiple confederacies would duplicate the expensive machinery of sovereignty, while one federal government can consolidate common functions and reduce the total burden on the people. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
This essay is also important because it shows Hamilton’s habit of combining political theory with arithmetic. He is not only saying the Union is stronger. He is saying it is more economical. That is classic Hamilton: power, revenue, and efficiency all tied together. (avalon.law.yale.edu)
Related Links
- Federalist No. 13 Highlights
- Federalist Papers
- Alexander Hamilton
- Federalist No. 12
- Articles of Confederation
- United States Constitution
- Anti-Federalists (avalon.law.yale.edu)