Federalist No. 75 Highlights | FoundingTheUSA.com

Federalist No. 75 continues Alexander Hamilton’s examination of presidential power by defending the Constitution’s method for making treaties. Hamilton argues that treaty-making does not belong entirely to the executive or entirely to the legislature. Because treaties combine diplomacy, national commitments, and legal obligations, the power should be shared between the President and the Senate.

This paper matters because Hamilton explains why neither branch should control treaties alone. The President provides unity, secrecy, speed, and international standing during negotiations. The Senate provides deliberation, experience, and protection against corruption or betrayal by a single executive.

1. The President cannot make treaties alone

“by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”

The Constitution divides treaty-making authority between the executive and legislative branches.

The President participates directly, but a treaty cannot be approved without Senate consent.

2. Treaties require a Senate supermajority

“provided two thirds of the senators present concur.”

A simple Senate majority is not enough.

The Constitution requires broader agreement before the United States can become bound by a treaty.

3. Hamilton considered the arrangement one of the Constitution’s strongest provisions

“one of the best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the plan.”

Hamilton does not merely defend the treaty process as acceptable.

He considers it one of the best-designed features of the proposed Constitution.

4. Critics wanted the power placed entirely in one branch

“the President ought alone to possess the power”

Some critics argued that treaty-making was naturally executive and should belong entirely to the President.

Others argued that the Senate should control the process without presidential participation.

5. Treaty-making does not fit neatly into one branch

“partake more of the legislative than of the executive character”

Hamilton challenges the effort to classify treaty-making as purely executive.

Treaties resemble laws in their binding effect, but they are negotiated agreements rather than ordinary legislation.

6. Treaties are not ordinary acts of lawmaking

“neither the one nor the other.”

Treaty-making is not simply the enactment of domestic laws, nor is it merely the execution of laws already passed.

Hamilton treats it as a distinct constitutional responsibility.

7. Treaties are agreements with foreign nations

“CONTRACTS with foreign nations”

Hamilton defines treaties as bargains between sovereign countries.

Unlike ordinary statutes, they arise from mutual agreement rather than one government commanding its own citizens.

8. Treaties carry the force of law

“which have the force of law”

Although treaties are international agreements, they create binding obligations.

That legal effect gives the legislative branch a legitimate interest in their approval.

9. Treaties depend upon national good faith

“derive it from the obligations of good faith.”

Treaties are binding because nations pledge their honor and credibility to fulfill them.

A country that repeatedly breaks its agreements loses the trust necessary for diplomacy.

10. The President is best suited to conduct negotiations

“the Executive as the most fit agent”

Foreign negotiations often require unity, confidentiality, speed, and the ability to speak clearly for the nation.

Those qualities point toward presidential leadership.

11. The importance of treaties requires legislative participation

“the vast importance of the trust”

Treaties can shape war, peace, commerce, alliances, and national policy for generations.

Hamilton therefore rejects placing the entire power in one temporary executive.

12. An elected President may face dangerous temptations

“utterly unsafe and improper”

Hamilton argues that it would be unwise to give an elected President serving a four-year term complete control over treaty-making.

Constitutional design should account for ambition, greed, and human weakness.

13. A President might betray the country for wealth

“An avaricious man might be tempted to betray the interests of the state”

Hamilton does not assume that every President will be virtuous.

A corrupt executive might sacrifice national interests in exchange for money or personal benefit.

14. A President might seek foreign help for personal advancement

“make his own aggrandizement… the price of his treachery”

An ambitious President might cooperate with a foreign power if that power promised to strengthen his personal position.

Shared authority makes that betrayal more difficult.

15. Government should not depend upon extraordinary virtue

“superlative virtue”

Hamilton’s argument is practical.

The Constitution should not assume that every person elected President will possess heroic resistance to temptation.

16. The Senate should not control treaties alone

“To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate alone”

Hamilton also rejects the opposite extreme.

Without presidential participation, the country would lose the benefits of a single constitutional representative managing foreign negotiations.

17. Senate factions could interfere with diplomacy

“pique or cabal”

Personal resentment, political rivalry, or secret combinations within the Senate could prevent the President from being used effectively as the nation’s negotiator.

Hamilton wants diplomacy protected from internal political games.

18. Foreign nations need a recognized national representative

“the constitutional representative of the nation”

A negotiator acting merely as an agent of the Senate might not command the same confidence or respect abroad as the President.

The President gives foreign governments one identifiable official with whom to deal.

19. Shared power provides greater security

“the joint possession of the power”

Hamilton’s central conclusion is that cooperation between the President and Senate is safer than allowing either one to control treaty-making alone.

Each institution supplies something the other lacks.

20. The House is too large and changeable for treaty negotiations

“fluctuating” and “multitudinous”

Hamilton argues that the House of Representatives is too large, too frequently changed, and too public to participate effectively in sensitive diplomacy.

Its design is better suited to legislation than confidential negotiation.

21. Foreign affairs require specialized qualities

“Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics”

Treaty-making requires knowledge of other nations, consistency of policy, concern for national reputation, and the ability to act decisively.

Hamilton doubts that a large and frequently changing body can reliably supply those qualities.

22. Diplomacy requires secrecy and speed

“decision, SECRECY, and despatch”

These are among Hamilton’s recurring requirements for foreign affairs.

Adding too many institutions to the process would slow negotiations and increase the danger of disclosure.

23. Requiring two-thirds of the entire Senate could create paralysis

“a necessity of unanimity.”

If two-thirds of every Senate seat were required, absent senators could prevent action.

Hamilton argues that this could allow a minority to paralyze the government.

24. Two-thirds of those present balances caution with action

“two thirds of the members PRESENT.”

Hamilton believes this requirement provides broad consent without making treaties nearly impossible to approve.

It encourages attendance while preserving the government’s ability to act.

Why Federalist No. 75 Works for Highlights

Federalist No. 75 works especially well as a highlights page because Hamilton breaks the treaty power into its practical components:

the President is best suited to negotiate

the Senate provides deliberation and restraint

treaties carry legal force but are not ordinary statutes

the President should not be trusted with the power alone

the Senate should not control diplomacy without the executive

the House is too large and changeable for confidential negotiations

and the two-thirds requirement protects against narrow agreements without creating paralysis

Hamilton’s argument is built on distrust of concentrated power. He does not assume that Presidents will always be wise or honorable, and he does not assume that senators will always place the national interest above faction. The safer arrangement is to require both institutions to cooperate.

The paper also shows why treaty-making is constitutionally unusual. It involves executive negotiation, legislative consent, international obligations, and legal consequences. Because it crosses those boundaries, Hamilton believes shared authority is not a defect but the proper design.

Federalist No. 75 remains important because the debate over foreign agreements still turns on the same question: how can the country act with unity and speed abroad without placing too much power in one person? Hamilton’s answer is a President who negotiates and a Senate that must broadly consent.