Federalist No. 73 continues Alexander Hamilton’s examination of executive power by focusing on two safeguards of presidential independence: secure compensation and the qualified veto. Hamilton argues that the President cannot function as the head of an independent branch if Congress can threaten his livelihood or strip away his constitutional authority.
This paper matters because Hamilton explains that separation of powers requires practical defenses, not merely words written on parchment. The President’s compensation must be protected from legislative manipulation, and the veto must provide both a shield for the executive branch and an additional barrier against hurried, factional, or poorly considered laws.
1. Executive independence requires financial security
“an adequate provision for its support.”
Hamilton identifies secure compensation as one of the ingredients of an energetic executive.
A President who depends upon Congress for his personal support may not possess the independence necessary to resist legislative pressure.
2. Separation on paper is not enough
“merely nominal and nugatory.”
If Congress can control the President through money, formally placing the executive and legislative branches in separate constitutional departments accomplishes very little.
Real separation requires practical independence.
3. Congress could manipulate a financially dependent President
“render him as obsequious to their will”
Hamilton warns that control over presidential compensation could turn the executive into a servant of the legislature.
Congress could punish resistance and reward obedience.
4. Financial pressure can work through threats or rewards
“reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses”
This is one of the strongest lines in the paper. Congress could weaken a President by reducing his support or corrupt him by offering greater compensation.
Either method could influence his judgment.
5. Power over support can become power over judgment
“a power over a man’s support is a power over his will.”
Hamilton’s point is larger than presidential salary. Financial dependence can undermine political independence.
Officials who depend upon another branch for their livelihood may find it difficult to resist that branch.
6. Presidential compensation cannot change during the term
“SHALL NEITHER BE INCREASED NOR DIMINISHED”
The Constitution requires Congress to establish the President’s compensation in advance.
Once the term begins, lawmakers cannot use salary increases or reductions to influence presidential conduct.
7. The President cannot accept additional government benefits
“HE SHALL NOT RECEIVE WITHIN THAT PERIOD ANY OTHER EMOLUMENT”
The President may not receive additional compensation from the federal government or any state during the elected term.
This reduces opportunities for financial influence outside the established salary.
8. Congress cannot punish presidential independence financially
“They can neither weaken his fortitude by operating on his necessities”
Congress cannot reduce the President’s compensation to make resistance personally painful.
The salary protection helps the President exercise independent constitutional judgment.
9. Congress cannot purchase presidential obedience
“nor corrupt his integrity by appealing to his avarice.”
The same protection prevents Congress from increasing compensation as a reward for cooperation.
Hamilton wants to block both intimidation and bribery through financial control.
10. The veto is a qualified negative
“the qualified negative of the President”
The President may return a bill to Congress with objections.
The veto is qualified because Congress can still enact the measure with a two-thirds vote in both houses.
11. Every branch needs constitutional defenses
“constitutional arms for its own defense”
Hamilton argues that constitutional boundaries cannot protect themselves.
Each branch must possess actual powers that allow it to resist encroachment by the others.
12. The veto protects the executive branch
“serves as a shield to the Executive”
Congress might gradually reduce presidential authority through legislation.
The veto gives the President a way to resist measures that threaten the constitutional independence of the office.
13. Congress could otherwise strip away executive power
“stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions”
Hamilton warns that legislative encroachment may occur gradually rather than through one dramatic act.
A series of laws could slowly weaken the executive until meaningful separation disappears.
14. The legislature could also destroy executive independence at once
“annihilated by a single vote.”
Without a veto or another means of resistance, Congress might pass one law that severely undermines the executive branch.
The President must not be left entirely at the legislature’s mercy.
15. The veto also protects the public from bad laws
“an additional security against the enaction of improper laws.”
The veto is not solely a presidential defense.
It provides the country with another opportunity to stop legislation produced by poor judgment, passion, or misconduct.
16. Legislative majorities can act under faction or haste
“faction, precipitancy”
Hamilton does not assume that Congress is infallible merely because it contains many elected representatives.
Legislators may act too quickly or under the influence of organized political interests.
17. The veto does not assume the President is wiser than Congress
“rather specious than solid.”
Hamilton rejects the claim that the veto requires believing one President is wiser or more virtuous than an entire legislature.
Its purpose rests on the simpler truth that Congress can make mistakes.
18. Congress may seek to expand its own power
“the love of power may sometimes betray it”
Legislators are not immune from institutional ambition.
Congress may attempt to absorb powers belonging to the executive or judiciary.
19. Temporary passions may produce laws Congress later regrets
“impressions of the moment”
A legislature can be carried into bad policy by excitement, anger, fear, or pressure.
Requiring presidential review creates time and opportunity for reconsideration.
20. Repeated examination reduces the chance of error
“The oftener the measure is brought under examination”
A bill reviewed by both houses of Congress and then by the President receives another layer of scrutiny.
Different institutions may notice different flaws.
21. Bad motives are less likely to capture every branch at once
“infect all the parts of the government at the same moment”
Hamilton argues that faction or corruption may influence one institution without simultaneously controlling every part of government.
Dividing authority reduces the chance that one passion will immediately become law.
22. Preventing some good laws may still be worth the cost
“preventing a number of bad ones.”
Hamilton admits that the veto could sometimes block useful legislation.
He argues that this occasional loss may be outweighed by stopping more numerous harmful laws and reducing constant legislative instability.
23. The veto will probably be used cautiously
“greater danger of his not using his power when necessary”
Hamilton expects the President to hesitate before openly opposing both houses of Congress.
The greater danger, in his view, may be excessive caution rather than reckless vetoes.
24. The possibility of a veto can restrain Congress before it acts
“a silent and unperceived, though forcible, operation.”
The veto may influence legislation even when it is never formally used.
Lawmakers who know the President may reject a measure could abandon or improve it before passage.
Why Federalist No. 73 Works for Highlights
Federalist No. 73 works especially well as a highlights page because Hamilton presents two practical examples of how constitutional independence must be protected:
the President’s compensation cannot be manipulated during the term
the President cannot receive additional government benefits
the executive must possess a means of defending its constitutional authority
the veto gives legislation another round of examination
and Congress can still override the President through a two-thirds vote
The paper makes clear that Hamilton’s defense of the veto does not depend upon believing the President is wiser than Congress. The argument is instead based on human fallibility. Legislators may act from haste, faction, institutional ambition, temporary passion, or deliberate misconduct.
Hamilton also recognizes that the veto’s influence extends beyond the bills actually rejected. The possibility of presidential opposition may cause Congress to reconsider, revise, or abandon questionable legislation before it reaches the President.
Federalist No. 73 therefore treats the veto as both a shield and a checkpoint. It protects the executive branch from legislative domination while giving the public another defense against unstable or harmful laws.
Related Links
- Federalist No. 73 Full Text
- Federalist No. 72 Highlights
- Federalist No. 74 Full Text
- Alexander Hamilton
- United States Constitution