Federalist No. 60 was written by Alexander Hamilton under the name Publius and published in the New York Packet on February 26, 1788. Its subtitle is “The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members).” In this essay, Hamilton continues defending the Constitution’s Elections Clause.
This paper matters because Hamilton takes up the next fear raised by critics. In Federalist No. 59, he argued that the Union must have the means of preserving itself. Here, he answers the charge that Congress might use its election-regulating power to rig the system in favor of some preferred social class, especially “the wealthy and the well-born.” His answer is that the Constitution does not give Congress power over voter or officeholder qualifications, only over the times, places, and manner of elections, and that the structure of the federal government makes the feared class conspiracy highly implausible.
Full Text of Federalist No. 60
For the exact public-domain wording, use the authoritative Avalon text of Federalist No. 60 on your post page. The opening states Hamilton’s central concern plainly: state legislatures cannot safely hold uncontrollable power over federal elections, but critics also exaggerate the opposite danger by pretending Congress could easily twist election regulations to exclude ordinary citizens and favor a privileged class.
A short opening excerpt:
“WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State legislatures.”
Hamilton then asks what danger could arise on the other side. He says it is not seriously claimed that Congress would exclude an entire state from representation. Instead, the objection is that Congress might manipulate election districts or places of voting to help elect a favored class of men and make broad participation harder for ordinary citizens.
His response is that this fear falls apart for several reasons. The different branches of the federal government are constituted in different ways, which makes a unified plot on behalf of one class less likely. The House is chosen directly by the people, the Senate by the state legislatures, and the President through electors chosen for that purpose. Hamilton says that diversity of structure makes a shared class conspiracy hard to organize and harder to sustain.
He also argues that American society itself is too mixed for the scheme to work neatly. Different states have different property distributions, habits, and interests. In a country still heavily shaped by landholders and cultivators, the landed interest would remain powerful, especially through the states and the Senate. Commerce, meanwhile, would hardly be treated as an enemy, because national revenue depends so heavily upon it.
Hamilton then takes direct aim at the warning that Congress could help “the wealthy and the well-born” by fixing election places in convenient spots for them and inconvenient ones for everyone else. He argues that the rich are not clustered in one single region or class geography that makes this practical. They are dispersed across the Union, so manipulating election places would not reliably privilege them as a national class.
His deeper point is that if Congress truly wanted to create a class preference, the direct way would be to impose property qualifications for voting or officeholding. But the Constitution does not grant Congress that power. Those qualifications are fixed elsewhere and are not alterable by the national legislature under this clause.
Hamilton pushes the argument even harder by saying that if a federal ruling class actually had both the desire and the force to trample essential rights, it would not bother with cute election-law tricks. It would simply usurp power more directly. In other words, the objection is weak because it imagines tyrants choosing an awkward, uncertain, roundabout scheme when more decisive methods would be available to them if they were truly strong enough to attempt oppression.
Why Federalist No. 60 Matters
Federalist No. 60 matters because Hamilton narrows the Elections Clause debate to something more realistic. He says Congress must have a final supervisory power over federal elections so the Union cannot be strangled by state neglect, but that does not mean Congress can realistically turn election regulations into a reliable machine for class domination.
It is also important because Hamilton makes a structural argument rather than a sentimental one. He does not say, “Trust rulers to be nice.” He says the government’s branches are formed differently, the country’s interests are too varied, and the constitutional power in question is too limited to make the feared plot persuasive. That makes this one of the clearest Federalist essays on how constitutional design frustrates political paranoia.
Related Links
- Federalist No. 60 Highlights
- Federalist No. 59 Full Text
- Alexander Hamilton
- Federalist Papers
- United States Constitution