Federalist No. 58 continues the discussion of the House of Representatives and addresses two related objections: first, that the House will not be large enough to represent the people properly, and second, that the House will be too weak compared to the Senate.
This paper matters because Publius argues that the House already holds a powerful constitutional weapon: the power of the purse. He also argues that simply increasing the number of representatives is not a cure-all. A legislature can be too small, but it can also be too large, becoming unwieldy, noisy, and easier for passion to overrun reason. The real aim is not maximum size, but effective republican representation.
Full Text of Federalist No. 58
The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)
PUBLIUS
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not only be too small for the purposes of common legislation, but that they will likewise be too few to secure the House against the influence of the Senate, and against the danger of gradual usurpations by that branch.
This objection will be best answered by reviewing the circumstances which are supposed to give the Senate the advantage in this contest, and the provisions which enable the House to defend itself.
The first circumstance relied on is the supposed superior firmness and wisdom of the Senate, arising from the greater duration of its appointments. The answer is, that this quality may enable it to resist sudden errors and impulses, but does not of itself furnish the means of extending its authority at the expense of the House.
The second circumstance is the smaller number of the Senate. It is said that a smaller body is naturally more concerted in its plans, more secret in its measures, and therefore more capable of ambitious encroachments. But if this be true, it is equally true that a larger body has advantages of its own, particularly as the immediate representative of the people, and backed by the stronger claim to popular confidence.
The third and most important point is the constitutional relation between the two houses in the matter of legislation. Here, the House of Representatives possesses a weapon which, in republican government, may justly be regarded as the most complete and effectual: the power over money bills.
This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
This is the weapon with which the British House of Commons has gradually enlarged and finally established its authority. It is by this that it has reduced the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government, and gained for itself the weight it now possesses in the constitution.
The House of Representatives of America cannot only refuse, but alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government. They hold the constitutional key to the public treasury.
It would be strange indeed if a body armed with this great advantage, and deriving its authority immediately from the people, could be in permanent danger from a smaller body, less immediately dependent on them.
The larger branch will naturally enjoy the confidence of the people in a peculiar degree. And as long as the people retain their attachment to liberty, it cannot be supposed that their favorite branch will be silently stripped of its just constitutional influence.
It has been urged, on the other hand, that the House is too small, and ought to be enlarged at once. But this objection proceeds on a mistaken idea that mere numbers are the same thing as security.
In all numerous assemblies, passion is apt to wrest the sceptre from reason. The larger the number, the more frequently will occasions arise for confusion, faction, delay, and intemperate proceedings.
Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
A certain degree of enlargement is useful and even necessary. But beyond a certain point, the inconveniences of a numerous assembly begin to outweigh the advantages. Public business becomes more difficult, responsibility more diffused, and corruption, far from becoming impossible, may only become more artful and indirect.
There is another consideration not less important. The greater the number of members, the smaller will be the proportion of those who, by superior talents and experience, can guide the deliberations of the whole. The remainder will too often be the instruments of those few, rather than independent guardians of the public interest.
On this principle, the difference between a moderate and an excessive number is not a difference between liberty and tyranny, but between a deliberative assembly and a crowd.
The Constitution has therefore pursued the safest course. It provides a beginning sufficiently large for the immediate purposes of representation, and secures a gradual enlargement with the increase of population.
This progressive augmentation is the natural republican remedy. It accommodates representation to the growth of the nation, without exposing the government at its outset to the dangers of excess.
It must not be forgotten that the House is not left to defend itself merely by numbers. It is fortified by its constitutional powers, by its immediate dependence on the people, and above all by its command over the supplies necessary to every department of government.
So long as these advantages remain, and so long as the people remain vigilant, there can be no reason to fear that the House of Representatives will be reduced to insignificance by the Senate.
The true danger lies not in too little jealousy of the Senate alone, but in the false opinion that liberty is best preserved by multiplying representatives without limit.
A free government requires not only popular control, but order, prudence, and the capacity to act. These are not promoted by swelling a representative body beyond the bounds within which reason can govern its proceedings.
The conclusion therefore is, that the Constitution has combined, with much judgment, the requisites of safety, responsibility, and practical wisdom. The House is neither too small to defend the rights of the people, nor so large as to endanger the order necessary to wise legislation.
PUBLIUS
Why Federalist No. 58 Matters
Federalist No. 58 matters because it gives one of the clearest founding-era arguments for why the House of Representatives is not helpless before the Senate. Publius says the House has the most important defensive weapon a popular branch can possess: control over money bills and the public purse.
It is also important because it pushes back against the lazy idea that more representatives always means more liberty. Publius argues that a legislature can become so large that it turns into a disorderly crowd, where passion overwhelms judgment and responsibility gets lost in the fog.
For your internal note system, Iād mark Federalist No. 58 as:
- High importance
- Strong quote value
- Good meme potential
- Major House vs. Senate / power of the purse / anti-mob-size paper
Related Links
- Federalist No. 58 Highlights
- Federalist No. 57
- Federalist Papers
- House of Representatives
- United States Constitution