Federalist No. 56 was published in the New York Packet on February 19, 1788. Its subtitle is “The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives).” In this essay, Publius continues answering the objection that the House of Representatives will be too small to understand the interests of the people it represents.
This paper matters because Publius argues that the objection wildly exaggerates the amount of local knowledge federal representatives must personally possess. The chief objects of federal legislation are comparatively general — especially commerce, taxation, and the militia — and a moderate number of capable representatives can carry the necessary knowledge from the states into Congress.
Full Text of Federalist No. 56
The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.
PUBLIUS
To the People of the State of New York:
THE second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents.
As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed House of Representatives with the numerous branch of the State legislatures, which are in all cases very numerous, and in some very large, the true question to be decided is, whether the knowledge requisite for the due performance of the trust reposed in the federal representatives can reasonably be expected to reside in a body much smaller than those branches of the State legislatures.
The subjects of legislation which fall under the federal authority are few, and principally external; whilst those which remain in the State authority are numerous and local. The federal representative, therefore, though he ought to possess knowledge enough to understand the interests committed to his care, does not need that minute acquaintance with all the local details of every district which would be necessary in a legislature charged with the whole internal police of a State.
A proper regulation of commerce is one principal object of federal legislation. The knowledge relating to this object does not depend on every petty local circumstance, but chiefly on the general situation and productions of the several States. A few representatives from each State, who know its staples, ports, channels of trade, and commercial habits, may be well able to communicate what is necessary for sound legislation on this head.
Taxation is another great object of federal legislation. But here again, what is principally required is a knowledge of the general circumstances of the State — its modes of agriculture, commerce, and wealth — rather than a perfect acquaintance with every private concern and local peculiarity. The State legislatures themselves will continue to frame and administer the innumerable internal laws by which such local matters are more directly governed. The federal representatives need only such knowledge as bears on the federal objects of revenue.
The same may be said of the militia. Uniform regulations may be framed on the basis of general information, without supposing that every federal representative must know every company, captain, district road, and county usage in the Union. The general military condition, habits, and resources of the several States may be sufficiently understood by a moderate number of intelligent members.
If we take the three principal objects of federal legislation — commerce, taxation, and the militia — it will appear that the knowledge necessary for them may be brought into Congress by a few representatives from each State, chosen by the people and familiar with the general condition of the State from which they come. It is no valid objection that they will not know every subordinate and minute circumstance, because that is not the kind of knowledge which the federal trust chiefly demands.
The State legislatures, moreover, will remain in full possession of their local authority, and will be composed of more numerous bodies, nearer to the people, and more completely acquainted with local concerns. The federal representatives will therefore be aided, not only by their own information, but by the existing structure of state government around them. The connection between the two systems will naturally help carry useful knowledge upward into the national councils.
It deserves to be remarked also that the largest State may not require a much greater number of federal representatives to convey its proper information than a smaller State. The principal objects of federal care are of such a nature that they can often be understood through broad divisions and leading interests, not merely by multiplying mouths in a chamber. Beyond a certain point, more representatives may add more noise than more knowledge.
If it be said that a federal representative ought to understand the laws and habits of every part of his own State, the answer is still plain: the laws and habits which relate merely to local government belong to the State governments; the laws and habits which bear on federal concerns are those which a capable representative may reasonably be expected to know, or to learn, from intercourse with his colleagues and from the proceedings of the government itself.
Experience will also assist. The first Congress may begin with incomplete information, as every government must at the beginning of its course. But the affairs of the Union will become more familiar with time; intercourse among the States will increase; and the national legislature, even if beginning with a moderate number, will grow in practical knowledge as it grows in years and population.
There is another answer of considerable weight. The Constitution has provided for an increase of the House with the increase of the people. If, therefore, the representation at first be not so great as some may desire, it will not remain fixed at that point. The rule of one representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants gives security that the House may expand with the nation and with the increasing complexity of its affairs.
Let us not forget that in all assemblies the business is really done by a comparatively small number. In every numerous body, men of stronger talents, longer experience, and firmer character naturally take the lead. A very large increase of numbers does not necessarily increase the stock of wisdom in the same proportion. It may multiply local prejudices and make consultation more difficult, while adding little to the true legislative force of the body.
If we compare this matter with the practice of the House of Commons in Great Britain, after allowing for the many defects of that body as a representative system, it will still appear that very large populations may enjoy a substantial degree of freedom under a legislature in which the number of efficient and truly influential members bears a far smaller proportion to the people than is proposed by the federal Constitution.
The conclusion is, that one representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants is not too small a provision for the purposes of federal legislation. The House, beginning on this footing, may be both a safe guardian of liberty and a competent instrument of national government.
PUBLIUS
Why Federalist No. 56 Matters
Federalist No. 56 matters because it answers the fear that the House will be too small to understand the people. Publius says that fear confuses state-level local legislation with federal legislation, which is narrower and more general in its objects. Congress does not need a swarm of members to know every tiny local circumstance. It needs enough capable men to bring the main interests of each state into the national councils.
It is also important because it continues building the Federalist case that moderation is wiser than excess. A larger House is not automatically a better House. Knowledge, judgment, and constitutional growth matter more than stuffing a chamber full of members for the sake of appearances.
Related Links
- Federalist No. 56 Highlights
- Federalist No. 55 Highlights
- Federalist Papers
- House of Representatives
- United States Constitution