Federalist No. 55 was published in the Independent Journal on February 13, 1788. Its subtitle is “The Total Number of the House of Representatives.” In this essay, Publius turns to another major objection to the proposed Constitution: that the House of Representatives would begin with too few members to be a safe and faithful representative body.
This paper matters because Publius argues that there is no magic number that guarantees good representation. A representative body can fail by being too small, but it can also fail by being too large, becoming confused, unruly, and easily manipulated. The argument here is that the Constitution strikes a workable starting balance, and that the House can grow with the country over time.
Full Text of Federalist No. 55
The Total Number of the House of Representatives
From the Independent Journal. Thursday, February 13, 1788.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another, and a very material article in the Constitution. It has not been made a serious objection with me, because I presume that it will be evident to the impartial reader, that on this point also, the convention have pursued the line of moderation prescribed to them by the aspect of the case. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrasts to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open themselves to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret arising from the reflection, that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament, that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments, for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics, the advocates for despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have in a few glorious instances refuted their gloomy sophisms. And I trust America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their errors.
But it is not necessary to resort to the testimony of political experience in other countries, to decide this important question. The examples of our own country, when examined, seem to constitute a lesson equally instructive. It is true, as has been alleged, that the number of representatives in the two first Congresses, under the proposed Constitution, will be less than two hundred. It is equally true, that this number will be greater than that of the representatives in Congress under the existing Confederation. It is true, that in the latter case the representatives of the States are few in number, and therefore may be thought inadequate to a due knowledge of the interests of their constituents. But the comparison ought not to be made between the Congress of the Confederation and the House of Representatives, because the former possess powers which the latter will not possess, and the latter possess powers which were not exercised by the former, as an immediate representative body.
It is a sound and important observation, that in a representative assembly the number should be sufficiently large to guard against the cabals of a few; and sufficiently small to guard against the confusion of a multitude. “In all cases,” says the celebrated Montesquieu, “it is necessary that the people should have representatives; and they should have enough to feel all the different interests of the people, and too few to be unable to manage them.” Here, then, is the true line of inquiry. Is the number fixed by the Constitution, on the first instance, below the point which safety requires? Or is the objection rather founded on a jealousy that the House will not at first contain enough members to possess an adequate knowledge of local interests, and a proper sympathy with every class of citizens?
The first remark to be made is, that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature; nor is there any point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance, whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider them under the proportion which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. In Virginia the House of Delegates consists of one hundred and fifty-two members. In South Carolina the House of Representatives consists of not more than one hundred and twenty-four. In Massachusetts the House of Representatives consists of between three and four hundred. In Pennsylvania it varies from sixty-five to one hundred. In New York it consists of sixty-five. In New Jersey of thirty-nine. In Delaware of twenty-one. In Rhode Island of not more than ten. The proportion which each of these bears to the number of inhabitants is equally unlike. So great, indeed, is the variance, that we are left to infer that no certain rule can be drawn from the example of the States themselves.
The second remark is, that the House of Representatives is to increase with the population of the country, and at no distant period will probably contain a much greater number than is now complained of as insufficient. The Constitution has wisely made provision for enlargement. It has not fixed forever a narrow body, but established a principle by which the national representation may expand with the nation itself. If the number at first is not so large as some may wish, it will not remain permanently at that point.
Another consideration of no small importance is, that the federal legislature will concern itself only with certain general objects. The internal police of each State, the regulation of its local interests, the ordinary administration of justice, and a multitude of details affecting the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, will remain with the State governments. It is therefore not required that the House of Representatives should begin with a number equal to the aggregate knowledge necessary for the full government of every internal matter in the Union. Its principal business will be national, not minute and municipal.
It deserves also to be remembered that in all legislative bodies a small number of leading members generally do most of the speaking, planning, and shaping of measures. The multitude of members in very large assemblies do not necessarily add proportionately to wisdom. They often add noise, delay, passion, vanity, local jealousy, and opportunities for intrigue. The true object is not to collect the greatest number possible, but to secure a body large enough to represent the nation and small enough to act with order and understanding.
The objection that so few men will not understand the feelings and conditions of the whole people, proves too much. If pushed to its full extent, it would condemn every representative government ever formed, since no assembly can include every trade, every district, every sect, every occupation, every passion, and every shade of local knowledge in perfect proportion. Representation is by nature a system of selection, not replication. The purpose is to gather from the people a body likely to understand their interests and act for the public good, not to reproduce the whole people in miniature with exact mathematical likeness.
It is also a great mistake to imagine that because a representative does not spring from every small subdivision of society, he must therefore be ignorant of it. Men chosen by free citizens are commonly those whose stations, habits, and intercourse in life make them more capable than ordinary men of learning the general condition of those around them. Knowledge of society does not always depend on direct occupational sameness. Often the ablest representative of farmers is not the man who knows only his own field, but the man whose judgment and public character fit him to comprehend agriculture as part of a broader public system. The same may be said of trade, law, finance, and the various occupations of civil life.
A farther answer to the objection is found in the relation between the federal and state governments. The House of Representatives does not stand alone as the sole guardian of the people. The state legislatures remain near the people, numerous in their members, active in their powers, and capable of making known local interests, local discontents, and local corrections. The federal representatives will not legislate in a vacuum. They will legislate in a country where state governments, state politicians, state newspapers, and the public itself remain fully alive. Local interests, therefore, are not left voiceless merely because the federal House begins with a moderate number.
The truth is, that a representative body ought to be large enough to secure due acquaintance with the interests of the people, yet not so large as to become a mere crowd. If we consult reason, experience, and the examples nearest to our own condition, we shall find no cause to condemn the number established by the Constitution at the outset. The danger is not merely in too few representatives, but in too many. A numerous assembly may become the prey of passion, faction, or demagogues. It may grow turbulent, unstable, and incapable of coherent action. Public liberty is not served by converting deliberation into uproar.
In all very large bodies, there is another danger. The larger the assembly, the smaller, in practice, the influence of each member. This tends to diminish individual responsibility. When every man’s share in the result becomes minute, many are tempted to act with less caution, because blame is diffused and public notice is weakened. A member who knows that his voice is one among a manageable number may feel the pressure of character and accountability more keenly than one who is lost in a vast and disorderly throng.
The republican principle does not require that every law should flow directly from the whole assembled multitude. It requires that those who govern should be derived from the people and dependent on them. This dependence may be preserved without making the representative body so large that government ceases to be wise or effective. It is one thing to preserve popular control; it is another to substitute a crowd for a legislature.
I add one final observation. The federal House, if it errs at first in number, errs on the side most easily corrected. A body too small can be enlarged as population grows and experience dictates. A body made too large at the outset might bring immediate confusion into the councils of the Union. The Convention therefore acted with prudence in beginning at a moderate point and providing for future increase.
PUBLIUS
Why Federalist No. 55 Matters
Federalist No. 55 matters because it addresses a problem that still haunts representative government: how large should a legislature be? Publius argues that no exact mathematical answer exists, and that good government requires balance. Too few representatives may risk narrowness or cabal, but too many can produce confusion, passion, and instability.
It is also important because it keeps building a central Federalist theme: the Constitution should be judged as a practical system, not as a machine of abstract perfection. The House begins with a moderate number, grows with the country, and operates in a constitutional order where state governments remain active and local interests remain visible.
Related Links
- Federalist No. 55 Highlights
- Federalist Papers
- James Madison
- Federalist No. 54
- United States Constitution
- Articles of Confederation