Federalist No. 29 was written by Alexander Hamilton under the shared pseudonym Publius. Its subtitle is “Concerning the Militia.” In this essay, Hamilton takes up one of the most argued-about questions in the ratification debate: what should be done with the militia, and how should it relate to the proposed federal government?
This paper matters because Hamilton tries to cut through two bad extremes at once. On one side, he rejects the fantasy that the militia can be instantly turned into a perfectly trained national force without enormous burden. On the other side, he argues that the militia still matters deeply as a large, armed citizen body and as a constitutional counterweight to the danger of a standing army. His point is practical: the Constitution should allow the federal government to organize and discipline the militia to a reasonable extent, while leaving the states an important role in appointing officers and training it.
Full Text of Federalist No. 29
Concerning the Militia
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion, are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority.
It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower the Union “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS.”
Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia in the body whose duty it is to provide against military establishments, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence, than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the POSSE COMITATUS to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty; whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the posse comitatus. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its declared powers would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the posse comitatus is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the federal government over the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical.
What reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and conviction?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the national government is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps, should the Constitution be ratified, and the idea of an annual selection be formed, it is impossible to conceive that the people of this country would permit their liberties to be endangered by such a conduct. The more simple question is, whether the federal government ought to have the power to establish SELECT CORPS in such numbers as may be thought necessary, without amounting to a dangerous distinction; and whether such a thing, if formed, would not be advantageous in the present condition of the country.
It is generally admitted that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the best possible security of a free state. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union as to render the people themselves, in arms, the instrument of tyranny. A circumstance which contributes to fortify this position is the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed.
But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable, yet it is a matter of the utmost importance that as much as possible of the people should be brought to a degree of military readiness. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, nor even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry and of the other classes of the citizens to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the productive labor of the country to an amount which, calculating upon the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent would be unwise; and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.
But though the people generally may not be made soldiers, the people may be trained sufficiently to the use of arms to answer the purpose of a militia. And if a select body were formed upon moderate principles, it would probably be useful and would have the effect of answering the principal end of a militia. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little if at all inferior to them in discipline and in the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist.
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, should I be inclined to regard a select militia as the most natural defense of a free country. I am persuaded that the more the regulation of the militia is under the direction of the national authority, the more effectually will it be turned to that desirable object. The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would be injurious if it were capable of being carried into execution. A tolerable proficiency in the military movements is all that ought to be aimed at, and for this purpose one or two annual exercises may be sufficient. But to attempt the same degree of discipline throughout the whole body would be a solemn mockery. Real discipline and preparedness require more time than the people can spare.
The attention of the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of select corps of moderate size, upon such principles as will truly fit them for service in case of need, and will make them a real resource against sudden invasion and disorder. This, combined with a generally armed citizenry and state-appointed officers, offers the best balance between liberty and security.
Where in any country the people are attached to their local governments and to their rights, and where they are armed, and where the militia officers are appointed by the states, there is little danger that a small or moderate disciplined force, under the national authority, can become the instrument of oppression against the whole body of the nation.
PUBLIUS.
Why Federalist No. 29 Matters
Federalist No. 29 matters because Hamilton tries to land on the practical middle ground in the militia debate. He rejects both the dream of turning the entire population into a perfectly trained army and the fear that any federal role over the militia must destroy liberty. His answer is a mixed system: federal authority for organization and discipline, state control over officer appointments, a generally armed people, and a moderate select corps as the best realistic safeguard against both invasion and standing armies.
It is also important because this is one of Hamilton’s clearest statements that liberty is not protected by paper prohibitions alone. It is protected by a people capable of bearing arms, attached to their rights, and supported by state institutions that remain alive inside the federal system.
Related Links
- Federalist No. 29 Highlights
- Federalist Papers
- Alexander Hamilton
- Federalist No. 28
- United States Constitution
- Articles of Confederation